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NOTEBOOK ON EU AND TRANSATLANTIC DEFENCE CHALLENGES

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Why EU and Transatlantic Defence?

Today's security threats have complicated the reality demanding for a more coordinated and clearer European Union (EU) response. No single state is able to face the current challenges alone and, thus, European citizens expect from the EU to incorporate the role of the protector. In this context, the Union needs to be able to react quickly as well as effectively to address the threats in order to be in position to look after its security interests and preserve the right of its citizens to feel safe and secure in their homes. As the EU's role in security and defence is enhancing, the relations among Transatlantic partners are being questioned and challenge both NATO and the EU.

Today's Defence Challenges

Hybrid Threats

Hybrid Threats refer to *"activities conducted usually by state-sponsored, but not officially affiliated (deniable), actors that do not resort to physical violence aiming at weakening or disrupting decision making by generating ambiguity and confusion.* Non-direct action is the principal manifestation of them and can involve assassinations, corruption, spying, disinformation, manipulation, and economic pressure, fake news, information warfare, and social media manipulation. The main purpose is to weaken an opponent's society in a way that facilitates the ability of a foreign power to take advantage of the circumstances. Hybrid operations are often a prelude to more intense pressure and aggression, intending to erode the opponent's capacity to resist.

*"Competing institutions and overlapping jurisdictions of state; non-governmental and private interest groups; fluid territorial boundaries; increasing inequality and isolation of marginalized groups; globalization"… t*his is the image of today's world that facilitates the threats of hybrid nature and the EU territory provides a fertile space for this kind of challenges. First, the continent's digitalized economy and interconnected society with its laissez-faire approach provide a variety of attack points. Digital infrastructure enables hostile actors to have access to an amount of data and intelligence. Second, the entity's neighbors are today ambitious powers which apply asymmetric forces in Europe to project their hard and soft power. For example, this power projection can derive from repressive ideologies, which may involve silencing or eliminating individuals living in European territories. Despite creating a series of strategies to combat hybrid threats, Europe's response is still weak: There is a lack of coordination and of a holistic approach to this threat, as will be analyzed later in this document.

Energy Security

Security concerning the energy supply is an explicit element in the EU's long-term strategy. The EU imports more than half of all the energy it consumes, reaching €1 billion per day. Its import dependency is particularly high for crude oil (90%) and natural gas (69%). Some of the Member States (M-S) are also heavily reliant on a single supplier - including some that depend entirely on Russia - or a single transport route. Supply disruption caused by political, commercial issues or infrastructure failure creates a vulnerable environment for

the EU. For instance, a gas dispute between Russia and transit country Ukraine in 2009 left many EU countries with severe shortages.

Thus, in 2014, the European Commission released Energy Security Strategy setting certain goals:

- Energy security stress tests, disruption scenarios
- EU's Gas Coordination Group, which monitors developments in the gas supply throughout the year
- EU and Energy Community countries were asked to prepare regional energy security preparedness plans, which were reviewed and adopted in 2015
- Long-term actions in 5 key areas:
  1. Increasing energy efficiency and reaching the proposed 2030 energy goals, giving priority to buildings and industry, which use 40% and 25% of total EU energy respectively
  2. Increasing energy production in the EU and diversifying supplier countries and routes
  3. Building internal energy market and missing infrastructure to respond quickly to supply disruptions
  4. Creating a common external energy policy
  5. Strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms and protecting critical infrastructure

On this basis, EU legislation creates common standards and indicators to measure serious threats and define how much gas EU countries need. In 2017 a new Security of Gas Supply Regulation was introduced and added the solidarity principle: *"EU countries must help each other to always guarantee gas supply to the most vulnerable consumers".*

In short, the energy policies of European M-S increasingly incorporate security of supply. States seem determined to outcome disruptions to energy supply or significant price spikes and reduce the risk of denial of access to energy.

Cyber attacks

They have evolved into aggressive actions designed to shape national debates, referendums and electoral processes in European countries. According to Europol, a growing share of these attacks is a result of state-supported hackers, as today disinformation, rumors, and manipulation through social media, can reach deep into the society. For example, in France "MacronLeaks" was an attempt to influence the presidential election in 2017, which, however, failed.

Terrorism and Organized Crime

"Organized crime is, in essence, a continuation of business by criminal means, while terrorism is the continuation of politics through the use of indiscriminate violence by non-state actors". "Terrorists are political individuals, groups, and movements demanding change and using violence to bring it about. It is the peculiar combination of means and ends that gives terrorists their very identity and demarcates them from other social and political activists". Acts of terror for the terrorist are the equivalent of acts of war for the state and terrorist attacks aim to a maximum psychological impact.

Combating terrorism and organized crime requires a multilateral cooperative approach, since globalization has had a decisive impact as it created interconnections among different parts of the world, it cheapened and facilitated communication, transportation and transmission (whether of disease, crime, or violence). In this context, it also created transnational networks of terrorists and organized criminals and acted as a force multiplier providing them with new resources and opportunities. These networks are highly adaptable, often creating difficulties to governments to react in an effective and quick manner. For example, the Al-Qaeda network in Western Europe had created dense communication connections between individual cells in France, Britain, Italy, and Spain. These groups also promote drug trafficking, fraud, money laundering, human smuggling (an activity in Europe which had linkages with the Neapolitan Camorra).

Russian Threat

In Europe, Russia is the best-known hybrid actor, with an often involvement in European political processes. In this context, Russia's hybrid war to Ukraine and its destabilization eventually led to the annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014 and raised concerns in the EU.

However, the EU does not have a unified understanding as far as the Russian efforts to interfere in European electoral processes and referendums are concerned. *"Sections of the European public and political elites see Russian attempts to influence elections everywhere. Equally large sections of the public and political elites do not see them anywhere".* For example, after the Skripal attack, some EU Member States (Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) did not expel Russian diplomats enhancing the debate on solidarity among EU states and questioning the Union's coherence.

The rise of China

Chinese influence activities are less visible than Russian ones, however the economic espionage is very common. It involves cyber attacks against industries and research infrastructure, or strategic investments in key - technology industries. In this case, EU institutions and some European governments seek a more forceful diplomacy with China over cyber espionage, while others do not want to act against it due to fear of Chinese retaliation and a potential loss of access to China's markets.

Climate Change

Climate change remains one of the most pressing challenges confronting society and an effective response to it is needed. The issue causes significant geo-strategic and geo-economic consequences as well as global ones, such as sea-level rise, changing weather patterns and more extreme weather events, posing scientific, technical, environmental, economic and social challenges of adaptability to climate change. In this context, the European Union has an important role to play in supporting successful global cooperation and helping to meet the challenges now facing the planet. EU's presence on international level is evident as it provides its support and attends the international climate negotiation meetings (COPs). In this spectrum, the Union holds a leading role as far as research and innovation to tackle climate change are concerned, trying to assist in defining cost-effective decarburization pathways and in developing alternative technological and socio-economic.

Internal Challenges

❖ **Continuous population ageing**
❖ **Migration flows.** Global mobility is a highly stratified phenomenon, from the global tourist to the human trafficking and refugees, asylum-seekers forced to leave their country of origin because of climate changes, poverty or wars. This forced mobility has brought changes in structures and institutions in global political, economic and social relationships. The abolition of EU's internal borders created insecurity and challenged the cooperation of the states. In this context, one should take into consideration the impact of international terrorism in the development of migration-security nexus, due to its shaping the public opinion: *"any Muslim may be potential terrorist"*, this belief has led to the rise of Islamophobia inside Europe. However, M-S, instead of following a cooperative action, have individually defined their policies taking into consideration different parameters. For example, on the one hand, the instability in the MENA region puts Greece in an extremely exposed position to the flows of immigrants and refugees, and, therefore, the illegal immigration is one of the main threats undermining national and international security. Greece seeks to further integrate European policies in order to face the challenge. On the other hand, France temporarily closed its borders soon after the Paris attack on November 2015.
❖ **Euroscepticism.** The economic and social fallouts increased the voices of the Eurosceptics. After a decade of economic crisis, Europe's political systems are worn out and relations have worsened among some of the European Union's member states.
❖ **Rise of right-wing populism.** It is a type of response to unbalanced immigration within extreme right-wing enforced by the economic crisis and socio-political circumstances.
❖ **Brexit.** On the one hand, UK's choice to leave the EU poses a series of challenges to the Union:
  • The UK is rated 4th concerning the contribution in the European Budget, as 2,13% of its GDP is directed to defensive expenses and 22,3% to arms trade. Thus, its absence creates a gap which the rest of the states do not seem willing to cover.
  • The British military forces have experience and represent a major part of the rest European forces employable for expeditionary operations. This qualitative advantage derives from Britain spending 175.000 dollars/soldier while the EU of 27 only spends 146.000 dollars/soldier. Thus, the British withdrawal from the EU's Force Catalogue could create gaps to the existing capabilities of the other M-S.
  • The UK has strong global diplomatic networks, which the EU will lose. To specify it, the UK has global ties to the Commonwealth and has a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. If it leaves the EU, France will be then the only M-S holding this capacity.
  • The UK possesses a disproportionate share of certain strategic European assets. For example, it possesses 50% of aircraft carriers, 50% of nuclear submarines, and 16% of warships of the overall EU's armaments.

On the other hand, however, UK's choice to leave the EU will not necessarily create obstacles, since the country never showed much inclination to pool and share

its capabilities with other countries. On the contrary, cooperation within the EU could be more accelerated than ever. Why?

- Often the British have chosen to block the European integration. Given that British usually advocated against deeper defence cooperation in the EU, the absence of the UK will now allow the Union to pursue deeper defence cooperation without British obstructionism and vetoes.
- Despite its above mentioned economic presence in EU's budget, the UK has avoided an important involvement in operations under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the last years of its membership, the UK was only the 5th largest contributor to CSDP operations (after France, Italy, Germany and Spain) accounting 3, 6% of contributions to EU military operations. However, in a post-Brexit era, in case Britain finds an interest to participate in specific projects, it could still conclude an agreement with the EU, since non-Member States have the possibility to take part in CSDP operations and defence projects (e.g. Norway).
- The UK was an 'Atlanticist' voice in the EU. Its leading role in NATO and its bilateral relationship with the United States resulted to attempts of ensuring close NATO-EU cooperation but also of blocking the case of a closer EU cooperation which could destabilize the balances within the Atlantic Alliance. With UK's absence, the EU M-S have the chance to enhance their cooperation in the defence sector.

However, it is highlighted that, still, the two sides, share common concerns, such as radicalization, terrorism, state failure, cyber security, migration, climate change and the insecurity deriving from President Donald J. Trump's contradictory statements on NATO defence alliance (using blame and shame policies).

How to face the challenges: The road to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The conflicts that took place in the Balkans right after the end of the Cold War made evident the need for the EU to play a more determinant role in the conflict prevention and crisis management. In 1992 the so-called **"Petersberg Tasks"** were agreed by the Western European Union (WEU) and later, in 1999, were incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) through the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Petersburg Tasks defined the type of military action that the EU can undertake in crisis management operations and formed a part of the then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - now CSDP. Military units could be deployed with:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks
- peacekeeping tasks
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking

The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999codified new structures for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), constructing the basement for what would eventually become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the CFSP, and raised the EU's foreign policy profile by creating the post of the "High Representative for Common Foreign and

Security Policy" to allow the EU to speak with *"one face and one voice on foreign policy matters".* Javier Solana of Spain was appointed High Representative until 2009.

The same year, at the **Cologne European Council Summit (Germany)**, European states expressed the willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, based on credible military capacity, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises where NATO would not involve. In the recognition that the evolution of the CSDP was a prerequisite for the Union to play a full role on the international stage, EU M-S agreed on the need to put in place institutional arrangements for the analysis, planning and conduct of military operations and 5 principles were outlined in this direction:

- The possibility of all EU M-S, to fully and equally participate in EU operations;
- Arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU M-S to ensure their fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations;
- Arrangements to ensure that all participants in an EU-led operation will have equal rights in respect of the conduct of that operation, without prejudice to the principle of the EU's decision-making autonomy;
- The development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU;
- Ways to ensure the possibility for WEU Associate Partners to be involved.

In this context and in order to manage crises, in 2000, in **Nice**, the EU proceeded to the creation of the following defence and security structures:

- Political and Security Committee
- Military Committee of the EU
- Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
- Politico-Military Group
- Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
- European Union Military Staff
- Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
- European Defence Agency
- European Security and Defence College
- European Institute for Security Studies
- European Satellite Centre
- European Operation Centre

Later, **the Berlin Plus Agreement** (2003)assured that the EU would make use of NATO capabilities in EU-led operations, ensuring the cooperation and the avoidance of overlapping or duplication of assets between the two partners. Operation Concordia (2003) and EUFOR Althea (2004-current) were launched under this agreement.

Also, the **European Security Strategy (ESS)** was adopted by the European Council on December 2003, providing the conceptual framework for the CFSP. The split between EU M-S over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance the internal cohesion of the Union. In this context, the former High Representative, Javier Solana, presented a document entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World" in which for the first time the EU's security environment and key security challenges are identified. The ESS recognized 5 key threats:

- terrorism
- proliferation of WMD
- regional conflicts
- state failure
- organized crime

Furthermore, the ESS prioritized building security in the EU's neighborhood and acknowledged the interdependence of various global security challenges. Finally, it highlighted the necessity of engaging a more active role and the importance of international cooperation and EU partnerships as ways to tackle effectively the threats.

Four years after the adoption of the ESS, the High Representative was tasked review the progress of its implementation. The resulting document came out in 2008 entitled "Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World" and confirmed the validity of the 2003 ESS, stressing the need to be *"more capable, more coherent and more active"*.

The following year, **the Lisbon Treaty** came into force and was a milestone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The Treaty allowed for the creation of a framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation and of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and expanded the Petersberg Tasks to include (Art. 43.1):

> *Article 43 1.*
> *The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.*

The Treaty incorporated the European – now Common - Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP) and all its developments since the Cologne European Council in 1999. For example, the mutual assistance clause, inspired by Article V of the WEU Treaty, states that *"if a M-S is victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other M-S shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 [the right to self-defence] of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States"* (TEU Art. 42.7). This includes that all these *"commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation"*.

Also, in this context and in order to contribute to a new stage in the development of the CSDP some tools were conducted:

❖ **Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)**

The Lisbon Treaty provides that a group of member states can strengthen their cooperation in defence issues by setting up a permanent structured cooperation (TEU, Art. 42.6). In more than a decade later, on 11 December 2017, the Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO, in which 25 M-S agreed to participate (except for Denmark, Malta, and the UK). Through PESCO, M-S increase their effectiveness in addressing security challenges and strengthening defence cooperation within the EU framework. This way, PESCO is the framework through which M-S will progressively enhance the EU's capacity as an international security actor in order to contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximize the effectiveness of defence expenditures. The projects adopted by the Council include training capabilities on land, air, sea, military exercises, cyber defence, operational readiness in the field of defence, etc. Recently, on 12 November 2019, The Council adopted an updated list of 13 new projects to be undertaken under PESCO, so as so far a total of 47 projects are in place. These new projects focus on areas such as cyber, diving, tactical, medical as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRND) training, enhancing EU collaborative actions, and capability development on sea, air and space.

In short, PESCO is expected to be a driver for integration in the field of defence. However, the decision to participate was made voluntarily by each M-S, and decision-making will remain in their hands. Even though each participating M-S provides a plan for the national contributions agreed, national sovereignty remains untouched. Military capacities developed within PESCO remain in the hands of M-S which can also provide them to other institutions, such as the UN and NATO. On 14 May 2019, the Council assessed progress made through a classified report. Progress was detected on defence budgets (increased by 4,6% in 2019) and joint defence investment.

❖ **Civilian Capabilities**

Civilian capabilities are at the core of every EU CSDP mission. The first Civilian Headline Goal was set in 2000 at the meeting of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira (Portugal), where 4 priority areas were for the EU:

1. Policing: targets whereby EU Member States could collectively provide up to 5,000 police officers for crisis management operations, with 1,000 officers on high readiness and able to be deployed within 30 days. Key tasks include monitoring, advising and training local police, preventing or mitigating internal crises and conflicts, restoring law and order in immediate post-conflict situations, and supporting local police in safeguarding human rights.
2. Rule of law: by 2003, the EU set out to be able to have 200 judges and prosecutors prepared for crisis management operations deployable within 30 days.
3. Civil administration (including general administrative, social and infrastructure functions).
4. Civil protection: teams of up to 2,000 people, all deployable at very short notice, which include 2-3 assessment/coordination teams consisting of 10 experts that could be dispatched within 3-7 hours.

After the 2004 Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels declared the above targets to have been successfully met, the **Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008)**

was formed to increase the attention paid to training, staffing procedures, and mission planning and added 2 new priorities:

1. monitoring missions
2. support for EU Special Representatives

and 2 focus areas:

1. security sector reform (SSR)
2. disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)

In 2010, followed the **Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010)**, placing greater emphasis on civil-military cooperation and on improving readiness and deployability. The CHG 2010 also focused on the creation of Civilian Response Teams (CRT), a 100-person strong pool of experts able for rapid deployment.

Then, the European Council, in December 2013, called for the *"enhanced development of civilian capabilities"* and stressed the importance of *"fully implementing the* **Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP)".**The CHG is the basis and the framework for the implementation of the multiannual plan which aims at helping the EU M-S to address the persistent civilian capability shortfalls through concrete actions and at maximizing efficient use of resources by a more coherent and cost-effective development of civilian capabilities. In this context, progress has been achieved (increasing the number of M-S with a national strategy to foster national capacity building for CSDP missions.

The principal body responsible for ensuring a sustainable process for development of civilian CSDP capabilities is the **Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)**, supported by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate of European External Action Service (EEAS). The **Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)** is the EEAS Directorate serving as the Operational Headquarters for the civilian CSDP Missions, led by the Civilian Operations Commander and under the political direction of the Political and Security Committee and the High Representative. CPCC promotes stability and resilience through strengthening rule of law in fragile environments, by offering advice and train to local partners in Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

On 28 May 2018, the Council adopted conclusions on strengthening civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Council identified actions to make civilian CSDP more effective on the ground. It also identified ways in which civilian missions could contribute to tackling security challenges.

Finally, on 19 November 2018, the Council and the M-S adopted conclusions on a **civilian Common Security and Defence Policy compact**, which set the strategic guidelines for the strengthening of civilian CSDP and contain 22 political commitments by both the M-S and the Council. The civilian CSDP aims to strengthen the EU's capacity to deploy civilian crisis management missions and some of its main objectives are:

- Reinforce the police, the rule of law and the civil administration in fragile and conflict settings.

- Enhance the civilian CSDP's responsiveness through the ability to launch a new mission of up to 200 personnel in any area of operation within 30 days after a Council decision.

❖ **Military Capabilities**

Military Headline Goals (HLGs) are designed to ensure that the EU possesses the military capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions encompassed by the Petersberg tasks. At the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal was established, setting amongst others the following targets:

- Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations: M-S must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of full range of Petersberg Tasks.
- These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.
- New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations.

However, the experience gained from the military operations EUFOR Concordia and Artemis resulted quitting the quantitative focus of HLG 2003 giving place to a more comprehensive and qualitative approach. In May 2003, the Council confirmed that the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained mainly concerning the deployment time. Thus, the European Council in 2004 consequently set a new target for capability improvement, the Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010), which identified several strategic scenarios whereby the EU should *"be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union [i.e. the Petersberg-tasks] …the EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement".*

The **Battle Groups Concept** was a central part of the Headline Goal 2010. They were created in 2004 and are military forces of 1,500 personnel that can be rapidly deployed within 10 days on the ground and can be sustained for up to 30 days. At the 2004 Military Capability Commitment Conference, M-S committed to the formation of 13 EU Battle Groups, with the aim of always having two Battle Groups on standby. On 1 January 2007, the EU Battle Group Concept reached full operational capacity. However, they have never yet been deployed due to political, technical and financial obstacles. In order to strengthen the EU's rapid response capabilities, EU leaders agreed on 22 June 2017 to bear the deployment of battle groups as a common cost. Thus, the financing of battle groups will be managed at EU level through the Athena mechanism on a permanent basis.

Finally, **Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)** was established on 8 June 2017 aiming to enable the EU to react in a more rapid, efficient and effective manner as a security provider outside its borders, responsible for conducting non-executive missions. One year later, the Council decided to give the MPCC the additional responsibility to be ready also to plan and conduct one executive CSDP military operation of EU Battlegroup-size. The MPCC is a permanent command and control structure at the military strategic level within the EU Military Staff and was created with the principle of avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO.

The EU currently conducts 6 military missions and operations on land and sea and there are 10 on-going civilian missions deployed in partner countries concerning border management, conflict prevention, organized crime and smuggling, reforming national security sectors or in monitoring the judicial system, across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

Source: European Union

Establishing the EU Global Strategy (EUGS)

The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was launched in late June 2016 and replaced ESS, just days after the Brexit referendum result was declared. The Union had suffered and now was the time to reflect, regroup and then reconsider its place in the world. Therefore, in October 2016 EU Foreign ministers decided on the most important strategic priorities (Council Conclusions) for implementing the EU Global Strategy:

- Security and Defence. They were based on HR/VP Federica Mogherini's Implementation Plan on Security and Defence and aim to improve the protection of the EU and its citizens, help governments and partners jointly build military capacity,

and develop better response to crises. On that bases, the European Defence Action Plan proposes financial help to M-S for more efficient joint procurement and capability development.

- Building State and Societal Resilience. Building resilience is equal to creating a more responsive Union. To achieve this, the EU supports good governance, accountable institutions, and works along with civil society. The HR/VP and the European Commission launched a Joint Communication on Resilience that aims to further enhance common action on building resilience on the ground, targeting especially the EU's neighborhood.
- Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises. This requires full engagement in all stages of a conflict, from early action and prevention to post-conflict periods.
- Cooperative Regional Orders and Rules-based Global Governance. Based on its founding values, the EU aims to the promotion of international law in order to preserve peace, human rights and sustainable development. To strengthen the rules-based multilateral system, the Union is committed to reform, transform, and further expand the existing system. In this context, it engages to multilateral projects, such as the Paris Agreement or the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

To achieve these goals some tools used are:

❖ **Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)**

The CARD is an annual review on defence implemented in 2017 and it provides an assessment system, an overview at EU level of defence spending, national investment and research efforts, and increases the transparency and political visibility of European defence capabilities. It also includes addressing of shortfalls; deeper defence cooperation; ensuring more optimal use and a more coherent approach to defence expenditure plans. The goal of the CARD is *"to develop, on a voluntary basis, a more structured way to deliver identified capabilities based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States"*. The methodology followed in order to create the 2017-2018 CARD trial run was based on 4 procedural steps:

1. **Initial Information**. An analysis of all CARD relevant information already available in European Defence Agency (EDA)[1] or M-S databases.
2. **Bilateral Dialogues**. EDA entered into bilateral dialogues with each M-S individually, to validate the information gathered in the previous phase.
3. **CARD Analysis**. Once the bilateral dialogues were completed, the EDA compiled and analyzed M-S' contributions and resulted in a 'CARD Analysis' that presented data regarding defence spending plans, priorities, defence research programs, as and opportunities for defence cooperation.
4. **CARD Trial Run Report**. The final report showed a positive trend in the overall defence spending of the 27 participating M-S over the 2015-2019 period, but also highlighted the fact that M-S still carry out defence planning mostly from a national perspective. The countries cooperate however a comprehensive EU

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[1] EDA is the European institution which supports the EU's defence policies. In this context, it also supports the CARD procedures without, however, fully engaging it. Thus, together with the EUMS, acts as the "CARD Secretariat".

approach is absent. In this context, the EU needs to move from ad hoc multinational projects towards an alignment of M-S' defence planning.

LIST OF ACRONYMS:
EDA: European Defence Agency
EUMS: European Union Military Staff
MS: Member States
CDP: Capability Development Plan

Source: European Union External Action

❖ **European Defence Fund (EDF)**

Launched in June 2017, it aims to promote cooperation and cost savings among M-S to produce defence technology and equipment. With this, the EU tries to create incentives for M-S to cooperate on joint development of defence equipment and technology through co-financing from the EU budget. Both the EU budgetary planning cycles and the M-S contributions finance joint development projects of the Fund.

❖ **European Peace Facility (EPF)**

It is a proposal by the High Representative to create a fund dependent from the Union's Budget, worth €10.5 billion, to enable the financing of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications. The objectives of the EPF are to increase effectiveness of operations, by ensuring that EU funding is available on a permanent basis. Financing is achieved through contributions by EU M-S based on a Gross National Income distribution key and the actions funded will be decided by the Council and M-S through a management committee.

A coherent approach from priorities to impact

Source: European Union

- ❖ In 2017 the EU set up a **Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox**.

In this context, the EU's cyber security agency, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), is set to receive a revamped, and stronger, mandate.

- ❖ **Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy is another instrument used by the European Institutions in order to communicate and make visible their actions and activities to the European citizens and beyond. In a connected world, it is important to project and communicate a clear vision. Promoting EU programs such as Erasmus+, Horizon 2020, a multi-billion EU Research and Innovation program, is an important part of EU public diplomacy. What is more, human rights, peace and security, gender equality and women's empowerment shape EU's priorities. The EUGS sets out the EU's core interests and principles and provides the Union with a collective sense of direction. Its ambition is to make Europe stronger so as to be *"an even more united and influential actor on the world stage that keeps citizens safe, preserves its interests, and upholds its values"*.

❖ **Working with partners**

The EU believes in a rules-based global order where multilateralism is a key-principle. Cooperation and coordination play therefore a central role in European approach and, thus, the EU will always work with partners, whenever this is possible. This is why the EU strengthens its cooperation with other international partners such as NATO, the UN or the OSCE. In this document, the examination of 2 such cases was selected:

EU-NATO cooperation

In a globalizing and technologically changing world and as we move away from conventional warfare, NATO risks being left behind as a 20th century institution holding on to an old political reality. To preserve its foundational strength, NATO should seek its redefinition and adapt to the evolving threat landscape. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the hybrid threats and attacks it faces. Thus, partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing these challenges.

The EU-NATO cooperation is an important pillar as far as the European defence as well as the Alliance's security are concerned. In this context, Joint Declarations have been signed establishing common sets of proposals and 74 concrete actions are currently under implementation in various sectors highlighting the added value of EU-NATO cooperation. In particular, on 8 July 2016 in Warsow, a Joint Declaration was signed outlining the specific areas of enhancing the cooperation between the two organizations:

1. Countering hybrid threats
2. Operational cooperation (including at sea and migration)
3. Cyber security and defence
4. Defence capabilities
5. Defence industry and research
6. Exercises
7. Supporting Eastern and Southern partners' capacity building efforts

Source: European Union

Four progress reports have followed since then to highlight the main achievements and added value of the EU-NATO cooperation. On July 2017, a second Joint Declaration was signed in Brussels aiming to accelerate the progress of the cooperation. Finally, on July 2018, another Declaration was adopted adding 4 more areas:

- military mobility
- counter-terrorism
- strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks
- promoting the women peace and security agenda

Nowadays, the debate taking place refers to whether the mobility towards a European defence should or not be implemented within NATO. In this context, enhancing a European Pillar within NATO seems to be superior:

- A stronger Europe means a stronger NATO as the increasing of the European defence spending means enhancing the European role within NATO. Hence, the European Pillar through programs, such as PESCO, will be able to contribute in a more decisive manner to the collective defence of the Alliance. And, taking into consideration the gradual withdrawal of American troops from many regions, the EU has to adapt its policies in these new realities and be able to autonomously manage crises and conflicts.
- Combining the hard power of NATO with the soft power of the EU has as an outcome the smart power.
- The more active European role will give the US the opportunity to focus on other common Western goals or/and occupy their means to American priorities.

OSCE

The OSCE has defined its identity and action through civilian and military engagements in different parts of the world. Its activities aim at improving the situation of individuals in the broadest area, in various aspects of social, political and cultural life, including human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and free elections, rule of law, but also freedom of religion and fight against intolerance and discrimination.

The EU and OSCE find common place of action in border protection and management as it is a challenge for bilateral relations of cooperation or conflict between the participating states, partner states, and third countries. Also, an economic dimension relates uniform and complementary systems of border control through cooperation of the participating states, and aims at preventing illicit economic activities and illegal trade (drugs, cross-border crime, human trafficking). What is more, for border security in Europe, stability of the former conflict areas - including among other the Western Balkans which had for many years faced wars and hostilities, serious violations of human rights and sanctions - is of particular importance. In these activities, the OSCE as an organization of regional cooperation in the field of security and human rights cooperates and improves cooperation with other similar organizations that share the same goals, such as the European Union, United Nations, NATO.

Conclusions: Limits and Suggestions

- ❖ **Europe's strategic culture** is based on seeking resolution through dialogue rather than confrontation. However, witnessing the failure of the dialogue has changed the approach of some states. Thus, to keep the EU united, a combination of the approaches is important.

- ❖ **Lack of a holistic approach** is detected since resources, competencies, and political choices focused on hybrid and other threats vary wildly across the EU. Hence, new communications, laws, strategies, task forces, funding, and member state working groups need to emerge to bolster the EU's security and resilience. Therefore, clear, legally binding definitions and a setting of common standards would facilitate cross-border cooperation between authorities. A comprehensive approach is a key asset to tackle the complex, multi-actor and multidimensional crises and growing security threats of today and tomorrow.

- ❖ **The lack of solidarity** for a more coordinated EU-level response is especially the case on the most threatening hybrid attacks. For instance, when Skripal affair became public, non-EU member states such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the US released statements in support of the Netherlands that were more forceful than those of the EU M-S.

- ❖ **The lack of coordination** as, for example, the biggest EU countries, France and Germany, have not really adopted the notion of hybrid threats yet, while states such as Austria and Italy are not yet much concerned about them. On the contrary, some EU states (Sweden, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, and Spain) have appointed special ambassadors to coordinate responses to these threats. It actually refers to states with a particular concern with Russia due to geographical reasons, while in Spain the 2017 independence referendum in Catalonia forced the country to rapidly take action.

- ❖ **A multiplicity of actors** is involved in defence processes: military, police, national services, private companies, media, organizations such as NATO, Europol, etc. Intelligence agencies are usually the first to track and identify while other investigative forces, such as police, rely heavily on them. However, in the modern world, a multidimensional approach to security is the only valid, efficient and credible approach to addressing security challenges and threats, with a view to preserving international peace and stability, given the complexity of the threats and the consequences.

- ❖ **Duplication** of basic capabilities then occurs sometimes among the different actors. So, a clear division of labour, or joint action with NATO, military and civilian intelligence sharing can guarantee Europe's overall preparedness for all sorts of threats, from hybrid to traditional military threats, and exchange of experts and officials between could improve the situation awareness.

- ❖ A basic **lack of resources** is also a crucial matter. Europe still heavily depends on American support. Even the EU's best-equipped intelligence services are not equal to those of the US or China. However, nowadays, key European states and global or regional powers, such as the US, Russia, China, and Israel, have started to employ sophisticated cyber weapons. This step will also affect sceptical states of the ethical legitimacy. Still, it remains to be seen whether such policies can have all European states on board or whether they will be left to the most capable ones.

❖ There is also a **lack of trust** among the European countries. For example, even states with similarly critical views on Russia do not entirely cooperate underling the different perceptions of a threat.

❖ There continues to be a **lack of preparedness** since the M-S do not have a harmonized framework to effectively address and respond to the challenges. A solution would be increasing the cooperation with other friendly actors. This could guarantee capacity-building, protecting critical infrastructure, etc, For instance, Europol has long supported European countries' fight against transnational criminal activities. Thus, Europol members could via data exchange formats tackle cross-border activities.

All that being said, it is highly important to highlight that the dynamics inside the Union have changed, as well as probably will its composing in case of Brexit. These conditions provide challenges but also opportunities. In this fluid context, the EU and Transatlantic Alliance have taken steps towards the European defence and addressing of the challenges and the progress made the past few years is more rapid and clear than never before.

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