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**Notebook on the European Union as an International Actor:  
Internal - External Security Dimensions**

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The internal and external dimensions of security are interrelated. External and internal security are part of single rather than separate dimensions. The 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy argues that internal security and external security are inextricably linked because internal security depends on external security. Consequently, for the last decade the Commission in particular, has put great effort into finding synergies between the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Many of the challenges that the AFSJ is expected to respond to, such as organised crime, illegal immigration and terrorism, have an international dimension. Therefore, the AFSJ has to become part of EU's external persona.

If we view the **European Security Strategy** and the **Internal Security Strategy** as the two key expressions of what the EU perceives as its strategic priorities, what is their relationship in terms of compatibility?

The *European Security Strategy* laid out *three key strategic objectives* in tuning its external instruments to meet the contemporary security challenges (terrorism, regional conflicts, Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, state failure and organized crime):

- ❖ extending the zone of security on Europe's periphery,
- ❖ supporting the emergence of a stable and equitable international order, particularly an effective multilateral system and
- ❖ seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats.

The *Internal Security Strategy* sets *five strategic objectives*:

- ❖ disrupt organised crime,
- ❖ prevent terrorism,
- ❖ raise levels of security in cyberspace,
- ❖ strengthen external borders management and
- ❖ increase the EU's resilience to natural disasters.

*Clearly, they are inherently intertwined. Are internal and external security now largely interchangeable?*

### 1. *A Secure Europe in a Better World*

European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003

- ❖ It was adopted by the European Council on 12-13 December 2003.
- ❖ It provides the conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- ❖ Analyses and defines the EU's security environment for the first time.
- ❖ Identifies key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU.
- ❖ The ESS singles out *five key threats*:
  - ✓ Terrorism
  - ✓ Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
  - ✓ Regional conflicts
  - ✓ State failure
  - ✓ Organised crime.
- ❖ It calls for preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts/crises.

- ❖ It states that the EU needs to be more active, more coherent and more capable.
- ❖ The importance of international cooperation and EU partnerships is also emphasized.

**2. *Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.***

Brussels, 11 December 2008

- ❖ During the December 2007 the European Council the implementation of the Strategy was examined
- ❖ The European Council made relevant proposals on how to improve the implementation and any necessary additions which could complement it.
- ❖ The resulting document confirmed the enduring validity of the 2003 ESS.
- ❖ It also highlighted the need for ESS to be more efficient, more coherent and more active.

**3. *Fight against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction***

Brussels, 10 December 2003

- ❖ Adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003.
- ❖ EU priorities in the area are:
  - ✓ strengthening the international system of non-proliferation,
  - ✓ pursuing universalisation of multilateral agreements,
  - ✓ reinforcing strict implementation of and compliance with these agreements,
  - ✓ cooperating closely with key partners and
  - ✓ providing assistance to third countries.
- ❖ - There are organisations that help at the implementation of it such as: **(i)** the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), **(ii)** the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemicals Weapons (OPCW) and **(iii)** the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).

**4. *Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (Gothenburg Programme)***

Brussels, 7 June 2001

- ❖ This Programme sets out a series of actions to be undertaken by the European Union to prevent violent conflict, human suffering and social and economic dislocation.
- ❖ It remains a valid policy basis for further European Union action in the field of conflict prevention.
- ❖ The EU underlines its political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU's external relations.
- ❖ The **EU seeks** to:
  - ✓ set clear political priorities for preventive actions,
  - ✓ improve its early warning, action and policy coherence,
  - ✓ enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention and
  - ✓ build effective partnerships for prevention.

**5. *Conflict Prevention - Council conclusions (for Gothenburg Programme)***  
Brussels, 20 June 2011

- ❖ Progress has been achieved.
- ❖ There is a number of positive examples illustrative of successful preventive action.  
**Nevertheless, there are much more to be done.**
- ❖ The EU has to strengthen and combine more effectively its prevention tools.
- ❖ Early warning needs to be further strengthened within the EU.
- ❖ More emphasis also needs to be put on taking early action and
- ❖ Sustainable partnerships with key partners need to be further strengthened.

**6. *Factsheet – EU Conflict Early Warning System***  
September 2014

- ❖ It is a tool for EU decision makers to manage risk factors and prioritise resources accordingly.
- ❖ It addresses conflict risks before they lead to violence.
- ❖ It is designed to bridge the gap between early warning and early action.
- ❖ The system enables EU staff to identify and communicate any cases of long-term risks for violent conflict and deterioration in a country or region.
- ❖ It promotes the systematic use of conflict analysis, notably in fragile and conflict-prone countries.
- ❖ The system involves the EU External Action Service, the European Commission, Member States and civil society organisations.

**7. *EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their ammunition***  
Brussels, 13 January 2006

- ❖ It was adopted by the European Council on 16 December 2005.
- ❖ The Strategy is a comprehensive document that gives the combined response needed to overcome the threats posed by the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition
- ❖ It underlines the need for consistent security and development policies.
- ❖ It suggests the full exploitation of all means available to the EU at multilateral and regional levels both within the European Union and in the EU's bilateral relations
- ❖ It builds on existing EU policies and actions in this area and puts them under a common heading.
- ❖ The strategy takes into account a framework Council Joint Action adopted in 1998 to tackle the threat of SALW accumulation
- ❖ The implementation is continuously monitored by the competent bodies of the Council of the European Union.

**8. Council conclusions on ensuring the continued pursuit of an effective EU policy on the new challenges presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems**

Luxembourg, 21 October 2013

- ❖ This document was adopted on October 2013.
- ❖ The Council of the European Union suggests that the New Lines (December 2008) have provided a concrete framework for the fight against proliferation of WMD.
- ❖ Additionally, the New Lines made it possible to concentrate the efforts of the Member States and European institutions on ambitious actions.
- ❖ **However, much remains to be done** to achieve a fully efficient and collective approach to fighting proliferation by the EU.
- ❖ The Council recommended the following:
  - ✓ protection of the access to proliferation-sensitive knowledge and know-how in the EU,
  - ✓ new proliferation pathways,
  - ✓ reaction to rapid developments in science, technology and communications,
  - ✓ cooperation with third countries and
  - ✓ support for the work of the International Science and Technology Centre.

**9. Council decision (CFSP) 2015/2096 on the position of the European Union relating to the Eighth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC)**

16 November 2015

- ❖ It was the first international treaty banning an entire category of weapons.
- ❖ It prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons
- ❖ The major challenge to the BTWC comes from the threats posed by unprecedented and rapid scientific and technological developments.
- ❖ Four guiding priorities were identified with a view to the EU involvement in the preparations and the work of the Review Conference in 2016:
  - ✓ building and sustaining confidence in compliance,
  - ✓ supporting national implementation,
  - ✓ supporting the UNSG's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons and agents and
  - ✓ promoting universality.

**10. Council common position 2008/944/CFSP on defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment**

8 December 2008

- ❖ The common position was adopted on 8 December 2008
- ❖ It marked the formal successful conclusion of the review of the Code.
- ❖ It set another milestone in improving the EU's export control standards.
- ❖ The Council's position extends controls to brokering, transit transactions and intangible transfers of technology.

- ❖ It demonstrates the EU Member States' determination to prevent the export of military technology and equipment that might be used for undesirable purposes.
- ❖ Article 8(2) suggests for the publication of an EU annual report.
- ❖ In addition to data provided in the EU annual reports, most Member States publish national reports on arms exports online.

<p>11. <b><i>Council conclusions on Military Capability Development</i></b> <u>Brussels, 9 December 2010</u></p>
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- ❖ It was adopted at the 3055<sup>th</sup> Foreign Affairs (Defence) Council meeting on Brussels, 9 December 2010 and some of its ***key points are*** the following:
  - ✓ Member States are encouraged to exchange information -as appropriate- and enhance transparency on current and forthcoming defence budget cuts and to examine the impact of these budget cuts on capability development.
  - ✓ The Council called on Member States to seize all opportunities to cooperate in the area of capability development
  - ✓ The Council encouraged the European Defence Agency (EDA) to intensify its work and to support Member States in their voluntary efforts to implement pooling and sharing initiatives.
  - ✓ The potential benefits of developing civil-military synergies in capability development and the added-value of dual use capabilities have also been underlined.
  - ✓ Finally, the Council reiterated the need for continuing to develop cooperation with NATO regarding the development of military capabilities, adhering to the principles of inclusiveness and autonomy of decision-making.